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University of Strathclyde University of Kent National Centre for Social Research
The introduction of directly elected mayors potentially represents a major reform of the operation of local
government in Britain. Drawing upon survey data collected at the time of the first two London mayoral
elections, this article considers whether such elections necessarily deliver the advantages claimed for them
by their advocates. It addresses three questions: (1) What was the basis of public support for the new
institutions; (2) who participated in the London elections, and why; and (3) what accounts for voting
behaviour in the London elections? In particular we examine how far the election of a single-person
executive helps provide people with a clear choice, encourages citizens to vote on the qualities of
individual candidates rather than on their party affiliation and motivates people to vote on distinctively
local issues as opposed to national ones. Our results suggest that while mayoral elections deliver some of
the advantages claimed for them, they may be less successful on others. The extent to which directly
elected mayors enhance the local electoral process is thus doubtful.
One of the most noteworthy features of the current Labour government has been
its programme of constitutional reform. Few core political institutions have gone
untouched since 1997: the government of Scotland andWales, the judiciary, the
second chamber, electoral systems and the law relating to political parties have all
been reformed. Local government in England, too, has undergone change. In
particular, the long-established corporate model of decision-making has been
supplanted by a more explicit separation of powers, comprising distinct ‘execu-
tive’ and ‘overview’ functions. The most radical form of this separation is the
directly elected mayor model, in which executive authority is invested in a single
figure, selected by local voters, while councillors take responsibility for scrutinis-
ing and checking the mayor’s work. This model is regarded by its supporters
as the most effective means of overcoming some of the shortcomings of the
previous, committee-based system. In particular, mayors are believed to provide
stronger political leadership for their localities, to improve the accountability of
decision-making, to reduce the degree of partisan domination of council business
and to increase levels of popular engagement (Blair, 1998; Commission for Local
Democracy, 1995; Hodge et al., 1997; Stoker, 1996).
In spite of these perceived benefits, elected mayors have so far been introduced in
just thirteen places including London, representing just 3 per cent of all local
authorities in England (Stoker, 2004, p. 127). On no less than 22 occasions, a
proposal to create a directly elected mayor has been rejected by local voters in a
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has yet to achieve much popular appeal. Since 2002, only five mayoral referenda
have been held (including one in Wales), in just one of which local voters
supported the proposal. More recently, however, the mayoral model has once
again found favour within UK central government.AWhite Paper in 2006 argued
that there needed to be greater concentration of executive power in local
government, with directly elected mayors being one way of achieving this. The
requirement to hold a local referendum before introducing such a change
is, however, to be dispensed with (Department for Communities and Local
Government, 2006).
It is thus timely to examine whether the introduction of directly elected mayors
yields the kind of benefits envisaged by their supporters. There are several existing
studies that have evaluated the impact of directly elected mayors, focusing on such
features as decision-making processes, relations within the local council and links
with local stakeholders (Copus, 2004; Leach and Wilson, 2004; Lowndes and
Leach, 2004; Randle, 2004; Stoker, 2004). In this article, we consider what is
arguably the key aspect of the directly elected mayoral model: the impact on the
relationship between local government and local citizens.We do so by reference
to the most significant example, London, where a directly elected mayor was
introduced in 2000 alongside an elected assembly.We look in particular at the
popularity of the new institutional arrangements in the capital, the determinants
of turnout in its mayoral elections and what influenced the voting choice of those
who participated in the mayoral contests.
The introduction of the mayor and assembly in London is, however, unique in
one respect. Rather than representing a change to an existing local government
institution, the new institutions provided the capital with a city-wide tier of
government for the first time since the abolition of the Greater London Council
in 1986. In this, the creation of the mayor and assembly is more akin to the
establishment of new devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales. The Greater
London Authority (GLA), comprising the elected mayor and assembly, represents
a hybrid arrangement, in part a ‘super’ tier of local government, in part a regional
tier of decision-making (Bogdanor, 2001, pp. 274–5; Pimlott and Rao, 2002;
Travers, 2004, pp. 8–9). Our analysis will therefore on occasion also be informed
by insights from the experience of the introduction of devolution in Scotland and
Wales.
Research Questions
We address three key questions about London’s directly elected mayor. First,what
was the level and basis of popular support for the new institutional arrangements?
Did Londoners favour both the mayor and assembly, or was one institution more
popular than the other? How far did people respond to concerns that the London
mayor would wield too much power, subject only to weak checks and balances?
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population, or was it concentrated among particular groups? Are the new insti-
tutions, in fact, a source of social and political division?
The second question we ask focuses on the level of abstention in the London
mayoral elections. The proponents of the mayoral model claimed that a directly
elected local executive figure would, in the words of the LondonWhite Paper,
‘engender enthusiasm’ (Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions, 1998). By giving voters a choice between named individual candidates,
rather than between political parties whose local leaders are usually largely
unknown, local issues and politics would be made more interesting and exciting.
Personality politics would bring ‘an element of fun, excitement and spirit ... to
local politics’ (Stoker, 1996, p. 12), all of which would help bring voters to the
ballot box. In practice, however, only 34 per cent of Londoners voted in their first
mayoral election in 2000, and just 37 per cent in the second (which was held in
June 2004 on the same day as European Parliament elections), little different from
the 33 per cent who voted in the 2002 London borough elections, and below the
38 per cent who voted in the 2006 borough elections.We thus attempt to unravel
why, contrary to the expectations of the mayoral advocates, the London mayoral
elections failed to attract many more people to the polls than already participate
in other local elections.
Our third and final question is what influences the electoral choices of those who
do vote.Here we address two interrelated issues.First, do voters’ choices primarily
reflect evaluations of individual mayoral candidates, or of the parties for which the
candidates are standing? Because mayoral elections are a choice between indi-
vidual candidates, it is argued that they loosen the parties’ hold on citizens’
electoral calculations. For example, Stoker (1996, p. 14) argues that elected mayors
‘imply a down-grading of party politics and a challenge to the process of
“politicisation” in local politics’. Second, it is suggested that elections based on
individuals are more likely than those dominated by national political parties to
focus voters’ attention on local issues.At the same time, they also make it easier
for voters to identify who is responsible for policy decisions, and thus whom to
hold to account (Hodge et al., 1997; Stoker, 2004, pp. 136–9). Together, these
attributes help ensure that mayoral elections are ‘first-order’ affairs, where citizens
vote on the basis of local issues. By contrast, many local elections have been
labelled ‘second-order’ events, where voting is motivated as much by national
considerations as by local ones (Miller, 1988; but see Heath et al., 1999; Rallings
and Thrasher, 1997). We thus examine how far voting behaviour in London
mayoral elections reflects the characteristics and appeal of individual candidates
rather than of parties, and how far voting choices reflect the key local issues facing
the electorate in London.
Data
Our evidence comes primarily from a survey of the London population con-
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Election Survey interviewed a random sample of 1,548 London residents aged
eighteen and over by telephone between early May and early July 2000.1 The
sample was obtained through random digit dialling, and yielded an estimated
response rate of 36 per cent.2 The data have been weighted to reflect the lower
probability of individuals living in large households being selected for interview.3
In order to minimise the burden on respondents and thus maximise the response
rate, the length of the survey was reduced by splitting the sample into two.While
most of the survey questions were administered to the whole sample, some were
only asked of (different) random halves of the sample. Thus the number of
respondents on which our analyses are based varies according to whether the
question was asked of the whole sample or only one half. The base for the full
sample is 1,548, while those for the half samples are 781 and 767. While
methodologically necessary, the split sample means that we cannot analyse
responses to questions asked of one half sample by those asked of the other.
In addition we also draw on a second survey of public attitudes among Londoners
conducted immediately after the second London election in 2004. The Greater
London Assembly Election Study interviewed a quota sample of 1,474 people in
London aged eighteen and over between 11 and 14 June 2004.4 Quotas were set
on the age, sex, ethnicity, social class and working status of the respondent. The
data were weighted to reflect the known demographic profile of the population.5
Unfortunately only a few of the questions asked on the 2000 survey were
repeated on the 2004 survey. This makes it impossible to address with the 2004
data most of the research questions addressed in this article. However, the 2004
survey did include questions that enable us to analyse the relative impact of party
and candidate evaluations on electoral choice in the second mayoral election.
These data are invaluable. The first mayoral election in 2000 was dominated, and
eventually won, by an independent candidate, Ken Livingstone. However, the
relative importance of party and candidate evaluations can only properly be
gauged in a contest in which all the main candidates stand on a party affiliation.
Fortunately, the second election in 2004, at which Livingstone stood as the
Labour candidate, provided just such conditions.
Attitudes towards the New Institutions
We begin by examining the basis of support for the mayor and assembly. How
popular were the new institutions? Did Londoners share the concern expressed
by critics of the mayoral model, that the mayor would overshadow the assembly?
And how far was support for the creation of the GLA spread across the popu-
lation, or concentrated among particular social groups?We also examine how far
having a directly elected mayor (and assembly) was regarded as a means of
symbolically representing Londoners’ distinct sense of identity, in much the same
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identities of people in Scotland and Wales. If this were the case, it might help
explain the popularity of the mayoral model in London as compared with much
of the rest of England.
The principle of creating a ‘regional’ form of government for London was
evidently widely accepted by the capital’s residents.When put to Londoners in a
referendum in 1998, the proposal to create a mayor and assembly passed easily; 72
per cent voted in favour of the creation of the GLA while only 28 per cent voted
against, although only just over one in three (34 per cent) bothered to vote at all.6
By the time of the first mayoral election in 2000, support for the GLA was still
running high.We can see from Table 1 that around three-quarters of respondents
expressed support for the creation of the mayor and the assembly, although more
were only ‘a bit’ in favour rather than ‘very much’ in favour.7 In addition, when
asked whether ‘having a Greater London Assembly simply adds one more unnec-
essary level of government’, only 34 per cent agreed,while 49 per cent disagreed.
The data in Table 1 also show that, in 2000 at least, rather more people supported
the idea of creating a mayor than that of an assembly.8 Relative support for the
mayor and assembly was probed further in the survey by asking respondents
whether, given the choice, they would prefer only a mayor, only an assembly or
both together. Just 8 per cent indicated they would prefer just the assembly,while
double that proportion, 15 per cent, said that they would prefer just the mayor.
As many as six in ten backed the combination of the two (the rest either rejected
both models or did not know which option they preferred). Faced with the
survey statement that ‘It is important to have a Greater London Assembly to keep
a check on what the London mayor does’, no less than 83 per cent agreed.
However, only a minority, albeit a not inconsiderable one (34 per cent), were
concerned about the amount of power given to the mayor, agreeing with our
Table 1: Attitudes to the New Institutions in London, 2000
How much are you in favour or against having a London mayor/a Greater London
assembly?
% Mayor Assembly
Very much in favour 36 31
A bit in favour 42 41
A bit against 9 10
Very much against 8 7
Don’t know/not answered 6 11
N 781 781
Note: Responses based on half sample only.
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survey statement that ‘having an elected London mayor will give too much power
to one person’.
Thus, immediately after the first London election, it appears as though the new
institutions commanded substantial popular support. But how widespread was
this support? Was it dispersed generally across the population or was it concen-
trated among particular social groups? Previous analyses of support for constitu-
tional change in Britain have found that support tends to be dispersed rather than
concentrated; thus, for example, levels of support for various reform options do
not co-vary by social groupings such as age or social class (Curtice and Jowell,
1998; Wenzel et al., 2000). However, analysis by Curtice and Jowell (1998)
has shown that popular support for some constitutional reforms is markedly
higher among those educated to degree level than among those with no formal
qualifications.
Another potentially significant source of variation in analysing who supported
the new institutions is territorial identity. Some have argued that support for
devolution in Scotland andWales is at best weakly related to feelings of national
identity (for Scotland, see Brown et al., 1999, pp. 124–8). However, others have
suggested that national identity does make an important difference (for Scotland,
see Curtice, 1999; 2005; for Wales, see Wyn Jones and Trystan, 1999). While
London may be a highly ‘metropolitan’ area, comprising an extremely diverse
population (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, pp. 5–9; Travers, 2004, pp. 155–8), this does
not appear to preclude the existence of a strong sense of identity within the
capital. Over three-quarters of our sample (77 per cent) indicated that they felt
themselves to be a Londoner,with one-half (50 per cent) declaring themselves to
be ‘very proud’ of this identity. Moreover, on the face of it, identity does appear
related to support for the new institutions.Among those who felt ‘very proud’ to
be a Londoner, almost one-half (48 per cent) said they were ‘very much’ in favour
of the London mayor, compared with just one-third (33 per cent) of those who
did not think of themselves as Londoners at all. Thus one potential reason why
the directly elected mayor has gained more support in London than in many
other English towns and cities is that the position is widely seen to represent
symbolically a keen sense of identity.
One final factor that might have served to delineate attitudes to the GLA is
partisanship. Labour was the only party to support the creation of both a mayor
and an assembly. The Conservatives favoured the mayor but not the assembly,
while the Liberal Democrats favoured the assembly but not the mayor (Pimlott
and Rao, 2002, pp. 68–9; Travers, 2004, p. 64).We might anticipate that party
supporters followed their party’s official stance on the new institutions.
To ascertain the impact of social groups, territorial identity and partisanship on
support for the new institutions, we constructed two multivariate regression
models, one examining support for the creation of a mayor, the other for the
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hypothesised influences, while controlling for the impact of the others. Our
dependent variables are the questions detailed in Table 1. Since the responses to
the dependent variables were recorded on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4 (where
1 = very much against and 4 = very much in favour of the new bodies), we
estimate our models using ordinal logistic regression.9 We include among our
independent variables those demographics that earlier studies of attitudes to
constitutional reform have suggested might play a delineating role: age, education,
social class, race and gender.We also include terms for whether the respondent
was born in London,whether they identify with London and party identification.
The results are shown in Table 2.
Neither in the case of the mayor nor the assembly do attitudes vary significantly
by age, race, gender or social class. The one demographic group that does show
significantly higher support for both the mayor and the assembly comprises those
holding a degree. In these respects our results are in line with previous research
on attitudes towards constitutional reform. Interestingly, however, having a strong
London identity is associated with a higher level of support for the mayor, while
it is not for the assembly. It appears as though the mayor has come to be regarded
by some Londoners as a symbolic expression of their identity whereas the
assembly has not.10 Finally, as anticipated, attitudes are delineated by partisanship.
Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters feel less favourably towards the
new institutions than Labour supporters. But while the official support of the
Liberal Democrats for the assembly at least finds some echo among their sup-
porters, that of the Conservative party for the mayor does not. This may, of
course, reflect Conservative hostility towards the figure who won the first mayoral
election, Ken Livingstone, whose controversial role as leader of the former
Greater London Council brought him into sharp conflict with the then
Conservative prime minister, Mrs Thatcher.
The idea of having a directly elected mayor thus achieved widespread popularity
in London. There was little public support for some of the main objections to the
model put forward by its critics. The popularity of the mayoral model appears to
have reflected, in part at least, Londoners’ association of the office with the strong
territorial identity that many felt, a process assisted perhaps by the profile of the
first office holder, Ken Livingstone.We cannot tell whether the limited public
acceptance of directly elected mayors elsewhere in England and Wales to date
either reflects a weaker sense of ‘civic identity’ than exists in London, or a failure
to mobilise local identity in support of having a directly elected mayor.However,
those areas currently toying with the mayoral model may wish to note the
association in London between support for a directly elected mayor and people’s
sense of identity.
Electoral Engagement
The first London mayoral election in 2000 was marked by turnout of just 34 per
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Londoners can have been unaware of the mayoral contest, even if some might
have failed to register the simultaneous contest to the London assembly.11 Thus,
the low turnout cannot plausibly be attributed to voter ignorance of the existence
of the contest. So what might explain the public’s limited engagement with their
new institutions?
Table 2: Model of Attitudes towards the London Mayor and Assembly, 2000
Mayor Assembly
B se B se
Age (60 and above)
18–24 0.02 0.33 -0.61 0.33
25–44 -0.13 0.25 -0.39 0.25
45–59 0.05 0.27 0.27 0.28
Education (no qualifications)
O level/foreign 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.23
A level 0.06 0.25 0.48 0.26
Degree 0.78 0.26** 0.93 0.26**
Social class: Registrar-General (V Unskilled)
IV Partly skilled 0.38 0.40 0.62 0.43
III Skilled: manual 0.61 0.40 0.46 0.42
III Skilled: non-manual -0.30 0.38 -0.38 0.40
II Managerial/technical 0.39 0.39 0.15 0.41
I Professional 0.70 0.47 0.28 0.48
Race (white)
Non-white 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.25
Gender (female)
Male 0.28 0.16 0.08 0.16
Born in London -0.31 0.17 -0.02 0.18
London identity (not a Londoner)
Very proud Londoner 0.75 0.22** 0.19 0.22
Somewhat proud Londoner 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.22
Not very proud 0.25 0.32 -0.15 0.23
Party identification (Labour)
Conservative -1.17 0.20** -1.06 0.20**
Liberal Democrat -0.89 0.25** -0.47 0.26
Other/none -0.82 0.25** -0.92 0.26**
Likelihood ratio x2 (df) 123.120 (20)** 97.964 (20)**
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.20 0.17
N 634 605
Notes: Ordinal logistic regression model, showing parameter estimates and associated standard errors. Categorical
independent variables show reference category in parentheses.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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One possibility is that people in London failed to participate because they felt too
little was at stake to outweigh the ‘cost’ of voting. There are two reasons why this
might be so. The first is that people felt the new institutions had too little power
to achieve very much, reducing the incentive to participate in the election. The
second possibility is that voters thought there was little difference between the
candidates and parties, and thus no effective choice. Such a perception would
again lower the marginal utility of registering a preference (Bromley and Curtice,
2002; Heath and Taylor, 1999).12
Indeed, in practice, the first London election does not appear to have provided
those registered to vote with much incentive to participate. Take perceptions of
the likely impact of the new institutions on various policy and governance
outcomes. The London Mayoral Election Survey in 2000 asked respondents what
impact they thought the mayor and assembly would have on transport, employ-
ment, policing and people’s say in how they are governed. While very few
thought the GLA would have a negative impact, more people thought the new
bodies would not make any difference than believed they would have a positive
impact (Table 3). Only in the case of public transport did a majority believe the
creation of the mayor and assembly would yield a positive dividend. Perhaps most
surprising is that just 45 per cent of respondents thought London’s new institu-
tions would give them more say in the way the capital was governed. This is
markedly lower than the proportion of people in Scotland (65 per cent) andWales
(54 per cent) who, in 1999, believed that their new institutions would accord
them greater say in the way their country was governed (Curtice, 2005).
The choices offered by the competing parties and candidates also appear to have
provided rather little incentive to vote. To test the distinctiveness of these choices,
Table 3: Expectations of the London Mayor and Assembly, 2000











Traffic congestion 38 52 3 8
Public transport 55 38 2 5
Employment opportunities 33 57 3 7
Quality of policing 42 49 3 6
Ordinary people’s say in how
London is governed
45 45 6 3
Note: Row N in each case = 767.
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the 2000 survey asked respondents to rate each of the main mayoral candidates –
Frank Dobson (Labour), Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrat), Ken Livingstone
(Independent) and Steve Norris (Conservative) – together with their parties on
a five-point scale that ranged from ‘strongly in favour’ to ‘strongly against’. If
Londoners thought that there were major differences between the candidates and
between their parties, we would expect them to indicate they were strongly in
favour of one and strongly against the rest. Yet such divergent judgements were
rare. Around a quarter of respondents gave exactly the same response about the
Conservatives as they did Labour, about Ken Livingstone as Frank Dobson and
about Ken Livingstone as Steve Norris. In each case, a further one-quarter gave
responses that only differed by one point. In contrast, when exactly the same
evaluative scale was included in the 1997 British Election Study, just 16 per cent of
the British electorate gave the same response to the Conservatives and Labour.13
It appears, then, that the first London election failed to provide voters with clear
choices between the competing candidates and parties.14
Another possible reason why some people did not vote is because they were
opposed to the creation of the new institutions.As we noted in Table 1, less than
one in five people indicated they were against the mayor and assembly, so
opposition to the new institutions cannot have been the primary cause of the low
turnout at the first London election. But it might perhaps have been a contribu-
tory factor. Certainly, participation in Welsh Assembly elections (Scully et al.,
2004) – although not in Scottish Parliament contests (Boon and Curtice, 2003)
– has been found to reflect attitudes towards the existence of new devolved
institutions.
To establish what impact these various perceptions had on turnout, we examine
participation in the 2000 London election among those who said they had voted
in the 1997 general election.Doing so means we largely remove from our analysis
those whose motivation to vote is relatively low in any election.15 Low turnout
in 2000 among those who voted in 1997 certainly seems to be linked to a
perceived lack of difference between the candidates. For example, among those
who did not see any difference between Livingstone and Norris, just 39 per cent
participated in the London election.16 In contrast, among those who perceived a
large difference between the two main candidates,17 turnout was twice as large, at
80 per cent. The picture is not dissimilar, albeit not quite as stark, in relation to
evaluations of Livingstone and Dobson, and Labour and the Conservatives.18 In
contrast, low expectations of the new institutions are not generally associated with
non-participation. The one exception is expectations about one of the GLA’s
most important responsibilities, public transport.Among those who believed the
GLA would improve public transport, 66 per cent of those who voted in 1997
also turned out at the London contest, while among those whose expectations
were more limited, just 48 per cent voted.
Thus, turnout seems to have been depressed at the first London election by the
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expectations of what the new institutions could achieve. Popular opposition to
the creation of the mayor and assembly seems to have played some role, too.
Among those who strongly favoured a mayor, 69 per cent participated in the
election, compared with just 40 per cent among those who were ‘a bit’ or ‘very
much’ against a mayor. Equally, turnout was 72 per cent among those who
strongly favoured an assembly, but was just 41 per cent among those opposed
to it.
If we proceed to estimate the effects of these factors simultaneously in a multi-
variate regression model, we find broad confirmation of the picture we have
painted so far.As our dependent variable is dichotomous (did not vote in London
election = 0, did vote in London election = 1), we employ binary logistic regres-
sion. The modelling proceeds in three stages. In the first model (based on the
whole sample), we consider whether demographic position, identity and parti-
sanship shaped participation. The demographic variables we include reflect those
factors – such as age, housing tenure, education and ethnic origin – that are often
found to affect turnout and/or political participation (Pattie et al., 2004; Saggar,
2001; Swaddle and Heath, 1989). Given that we are looking only at those who
said they voted in the 1997 general election, this means that our model ascertains
whether any of these variables were more strongly associated with turnout in the
2000 GLA election than they are with turnout in a general election. In the second
model, we add the role of attitudes towards the creation of the mayor and
assembly. In the third model, we introduce variables measuring candidate and
party evaluations, and expectations of what the new institutions would achieve.
Note, however, that the survey questions added in our second model were
administered to a different half of the sample than those added in the third model.
This means that the variables added in the second model cannot be included in
the third model. Thus, the three models are based on different selections of cases
(Table 4).
The first of our models shows that some characteristics commonly associated
with non-voting in general elections, such as youth and being a member of an
ethnic minority, were yet further associated with non-voting in the first London
election.However,model I also shows that, while social identity might have been
associated with support for the London mayor (see Table 2), it is not a significant
predictor of participation in the mayoral election (for a similar result in respect of
Scottish Parliament andWelsh Assembly elections, see Boon and Curtice, 2003;
Scully et al., 2004).
In our second model, the coefficients for favouring the mayor and assembly are
correctly signed, suggesting that opponents of the mayor and assembly were less
likely to vote. True, neither achieves statistical significance at the 5 per cent level,
but attitudes to the mayor at least are significant at the 10 per cent level, and it
should be borne in mind that this analysis is only based on a half sample, making
it less likely that statistical significance will be achieved. Finally, in our third
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Table 4: Models of Turnout at the London Election, 2000
Model I Model II Model III
B se B se B se
Age (60 and above)
18–24 -1.96 0.38** -2.65 0.81** -1.74 0.64**
25–44 -0.98 0.22** -1.07 0.35** -1.06 0.39**
45–59 -0.39 0.22 -0.29 0.36 -0.77 0.38*
Education (no qualifications)
O level/foreign 0.18 0.20 0.32 0.33 -0.29 0.32
A level 0.52 0.24* 0.56 0.38 0.19 0.39
Degree 0.78 0.21** 0.36 0.32 0.59 0.34
Race (white)
Non-white -0.37 0.19* -0.76 0.29** -0.10 0.32
Tenure (home owner)
Non-home owner -0.41 0.16** -0.95 0.28** 0.06 0.26
London identity (not a Londoner)
Very proud Londoner -0.13 0.20 -0.45 0.31 -0.08 0.33
Somewhat proud Londoner 0.18 0.21 -0.04 0.33 0.50 0.34
Not very proud 0.09 0.30 0.35 0.48 0.05 0.52
Party identification (Labour)
Conservative -0.57 0.17** -0.62 0.30* -0.11 0.29
Liberal Democrat -0.53 0.25* -1.15 0.39** 0.44 0.42
Other/none -0.53 0.28 -0.65 0.45 0.39 0.49
Favour London mayor 0.31 0.18
Favour London Assembly 0.29 0.19
Performance expectations (no difference/worsen performance)
Reduce traffic congestion -0.11 0.29
Improve public transport 0.93 0.30**
Improve employment 0.12 0.27
Improve quality of policing -0.28 0.27





Constant 0.13 0.14 -1.63 0.53** -0.58 0.34
Model x2 (df ) 80.649 (14)** 88.228 (16)** 52.106 (22)**
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.12 0.26 0.18
N 888 416 367
Notes: Binary logistic regression model, showing parameter estimates and associated standard errors. Categorical
independent variables show reference category in parentheses. Sample confined to those who said they voted in the
1997 general election.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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and Steve Norris, the more likely someone was to vote, though once this has been
taken into account perceived differences between other pairs of candidates or
parties do not make a difference. At the same time, expectations of the likely
impact of the new institutions on public transport also seem to have influenced
turnout, while other performance expectations did not do so.19
Thus, it appears that the limited turnout at the first London election primarily
reflected the limited incentives on offer to citizens. Those who doubted the
capacity of the GLA to have much impact on the key issue of public transport
were inclined to stay at home. So too were those voters, relatively large in
number, who felt that there was little difference between the candidates or the
parties. In this election at least, the contest failed to stimulate the enthusiasm, and
thus the level of participation, that the mayoral model’s advocates anticipated.Our
findings indicate that low turnout may not be a necessary feature of mayoral
elections. But if people are to participate, they need to be offered clear electoral
choices and powerful elected institutions.
Voting Behaviour
In the final section of our analysis, we focus on the behaviour of the minority of
the electorate who did participate in the London elections in 2000 and 2004. In
particular we examine two issues. First, did the direct election of a single-person
executive (i.e. the mayor) encourage people to vote on the basis of candidate
evaluations rather than on the basis of party labels? Second, to what degree did
people vote on the basis of their attitudes towards policy issues over which the
mayor and assembly had some influence?
We can address the first issue by comparing the relationship between vote choice
and both candidate and party evaluations in the mayoral election with the same
relationship in the assembly election. If candidate evaluations are a particularly
strong determinant of mayoral voting behaviour, we should find a closer rela-
tionship between candidate evaluations and vote choice in the mayoral election
than in the assembly election. In contrast, party evaluations should be more
closely related to vote choice in the assembly election than in the mayoral contest.
There is, however, an obvious limitation on how far this approach can be taken
in 2000. Ken Livingstone, the winner of the mayoral election, stood as an
Independent, having been expelled from the Labour party. Of course, his success
can itself be regarded as testimony to the degree to which having a directly
elected mayor increases the importance of individual candidates as opposed to
parties.20 However, Livingstone’s status as an Independent means we have to
exclude from our analysis those who supported him in 2000, since there is no
party evaluation whose impact can be compared with that arising from evalua-
tions of Livingstone himself.21 In contrast, this problem does not arise in 2004,













































MAYORAL ELECTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM LONDON 13
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2007
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 14 SESS: 103 OUTPUT: Fri Nov 30 18:34:25 2007
/v2451/blackwell/journals/POST_v0_i0/post_705
stood as its official candidate.As noted earlier,we have data from the 2004 Greater
London Assembly Election Study to assess the relative impact of candidate and party
evaluations in the second mayoral and assembly election.
How people vote can, of course, be influenced by the structure of the ballot. The
assembly elections in 2000 and 2004 took place under the Additional Member
System, whereby voters had two votes, one for a member for their assembly
constituency, the other for a London-wide party list.We use reported list vote in
our analysis because this is less likely to be influenced by strategic considerations
or the popularity of a particular candidate; it is thus arguably the better gauge of
party preference. The mayoral elections in 2000 and 2004 were run using the
SupplementaryVote System, under which voters are invited to express a first and
second preference, the latter coming into play should no candidate secure a
majority of first-preference votes. Under this system, a voter’s first-preference
vote is unlikely to be affected by strategic considerations; a voter concerned about
wasting their vote or wishing to deny electoral victory to a particular candidate
can still opt to back a more popular candidate with their second preference.22
We thus measure vote choice in the mayoral election by reference to reported
first-preference vote. Evaluations of candidates and parties are measured in 2000
using the same five-point scale (‘strongly in favour’ to ‘strongly against’) we
introduced in the previous section. On the 2004 survey, they are measured by a
similar scale, albeit a seven-point one that ranged from ‘like a lot’ to ‘dislike a lot’.
Simple bivariate statistics provide some support for the view that candidate
evaluations matter more in the mayoral contest than in the assembly election.
Thus, in 2000, 80 per cent of those who favoured Steve Norris voted for him in
the mayoral contest,23 whereas only 56 per cent of this group also voted for
Norris’s party, the Conservatives, in the assembly contest (Table 5).Granted, those
who favoured the Conservatives were also more likely to have voted for Norris
(82 per cent) than for his party (67 per cent), but the gap between the two
statistics is smaller. The position is even clearer in respect of voting for Frank
Dobson and Labour. Thus, far more people who favoured Dobson voted for him
(81 per cent) than went on to support his party (63 per cent). But there was no
premium for the candidate among those who favoured the party, 61 per cent of
whom voted for Dobson against 60 per cent who voted Labour. At the second
GLA elections in 2004, far more of those who favoured Labour’s mayoral
candidate,Ken Livingstone, voted for him than voted for the Labour party (85 per
cent to 66 per cent),while the equivalent gap among those who favoured Labour
is rather smaller. There is no discernible ‘candidate’ or ‘party’ effect in 2004 for the
Conservatives and their mayoral candidate, Steve Norris.
We can evaluate more rigorously the relative importance of candidate and party
evaluations in the mayoral and assembly elections by modelling vote choice in the
two sets of elections against these evaluations. This requires us to construct two
models for each election. In the first model the dependent variable is whether or
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candidate of one of the three main parties – in 2000, Frank Dobson (Labour),
Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrat) and Steve Norris (Conservative); in 2004,
Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat), Ken Livingstone (Labour) and Steve Norris
(Conservative). In the second model the dependent variable is whether the
respondent voted for the Conservatives, Labour or the Liberal Democrats on the
assembly (list) vote.24 Since the dependent variable in both models represents a
choice between three options, we estimate the parameters using multinomial
logistic regression. The results show the effects of candidate and party evaluations
on the (log) odds of voting for the Conservatives or Labour, and for their
respective mayoral candidates, as compared with the (log) odds of voting for the
Liberal Democrats, and for their mayoral candidate.
The results, in Table 6, confirm those of our bivariate analysis. Note first that the
odds of voting for a party or candidate are predominantly related to evaluations
of that party and candidate, rather than to those of another candidate or party.We
have therefore highlighted these results in the table. Examination of the results
reveals that, in general, candidate evaluations are stronger predictors than party
evaluations of vote choice in the mayoral election,while party evaluations matter
more when it comes to the assembly vote. Because candidate and party evalua-
tions are measured on the same scale in the mayoral and assembly vote models
(five-point in 2000, seven-point in 2004), their relative effects on voting behav-
iour can be gauged by comparing the size of their coefficients. So, if we take as
an example voting for Frank Dobson in 2000, we see that evaluations of the
candidate are a more powerful predictor of voting than evaluations of his party










Voted Norris 80 (110) 82 (89)
Voted Conservative 56 (84) 67 (75)
Voted Dobson 81 (75) 61 (77)
Voted Labour 63 (74) 60 (157)
2004
Voted Norris 82 (133) 87 (133)
Voted Conservative 80 (98) 87 (104)
Voted Livingstone 85 (220) 86 (166)
Voted Labour 66 (136) 74 (120)
Notes: Favour = ‘Strongly favour’ and ‘favour’ a candidate/party on a 5-point scale (2000) and points 6–7 on a 7-point
scale (1 = dislike a lot, 7 = like a lot) (2004). Figures are column percentages, with the base N in parentheses.
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(the coefficients being 1.69 and 1.24, respectively).When it comes to voting for
the Labour party, however, evaluations of the party are a stronger predictor than
evaluations of the candidate (the respective coefficients being 0.74 and 0.43).
Comparison of the results in 2004 for Norris and the Conservatives and for
Livingstone and Labour reveals a similar pattern. The one exception is for Norris
and the Conservatives in 2000, when evaluations of Norris were a stronger
predictor of voting for the Conservative party on the assembly list vote than were
evaluations of the party itself (albeit that candidate evaluations were somewhat
weaker in the case of the assembly vote than for the mayoral vote).25
It could, of course, be argued that the circumstances of the first two London
elections, and in particular the undoubted personal popularity of Ken Living-
stone, meant that candidate evaluations played a greater role in 2000 and 2004
than is likely in future contests. But equally, Livingstone’s success could be
regarded as clear affirmation that mayoral elections have the potential to focus
voters’ minds on whom they judge would make the best chief executive of their
local council, rather than on their party label. Certainly our analysis of the first








Favour Norris 1.80 (0.31)** 1.11 (0.23)** 0.10 (0.30) 0.04 (0.17)
Favour Con 0.98 (0.28)** 0.85 (0.23)** 0.58 (0.33) -0.48 (0.18)**
Favour Dobson 0.00 (0.25) 0.03 (0.21) 1.69 (0.30)** 0.43 (0.16)**
Favour Labour 0.25 (0.27) -0.60 (0.22)** 1.24 (0.34)** 0.74 (0.20)**
2004
Favour Norris 1.03 (0.17)** 0.14 (0.16) 0.04 (0.12) -0.02 (0.12)
Favour Con 0.61 (0.13)** 1.03 (0.16)** -0.02 (0.12) 0.14 (0.13)
Favour Liv’stone -0.06 (0.12) -0.08 (0.13) 0.74 (0.10)** 0.31 (0.12)**
Favour Labour -0.15 (0.13) -0.10 (0.13) 0.24 (0.09)** 0.62 (0.11)**
Notes: Multinomial logit models showing parameter estimates and standard errors in parentheses. The reference
category is voted Kramer/Hughes (mayoral model) and voted Liberal Democrat (assembly model).
Model summaries:
2000
Mayoral model: likelihood ratio test (x2) of 343.151 with 8df, significant at the 0.001 level. N = 266.
Assembly model: likelihood ratio test (x2) of 319.249 with 8df, significant at the 0.001 level. N = 350.
2004
Mayoral model: likelihood ratio test (x2) of 590.178 with 8df, significant at the 0.001 level. N = 521.
Assembly model: likelihood ratio test (x2) of 419.305 with 8df, significant at the 0.001 level. N = 405.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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two London contests substantiates the mayoral model’s advocates in their claim
that such contests encourage voters to focus on personal qualities more than on
partisan ones.
But this still leaves an important question. Do mayoral contests also encourage
people to vote on the issues confronting the mayor and the assembly, rather than
treating the London election as a chance to register their dissatisfaction with the
national government at Westminster? After all, the low turnout and poor per-
formance by the incumbent party at Westminster (Labour) meant that the 2000
election bore many of the hallmarks of a ‘second-order’ contest, where the
election is used by voters to protest against the policy and performance of the
national government (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Clearly, if mayoral elections are
used by voters to express a judgement on the national government, as often
appears to be the case in local council elections (Heath et al., 1999;Miller, 1988),
then their introduction will do little to enhance the accountability or respon-
siveness of local government.
To help establish the ‘first-order’ or ‘second-order’ status of the London election
in 2000, the London Mayoral Election Survey asked its respondents how they
would have voted if a Westminster election had been held on the day of the
mayoral election. The results suggest that Labour’s share of the vote would
have been ten points higher in such a contest than it actually was on the
assembly list vote. Similar findings have also been found in respect of devolved
elections in Scotland and Wales (Curtice, 2003) and are, of course, precisely
what we would anticipate if voters were using the London election to send the
government a protest note.
But if Labour’s performance in the London election is to be explained by
widespread protest at the national party, then we should find that Labour sym-
pathisers’ failure to vote for the party is associated with negative evaluations of
government performance. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Granted,
those who said they would have voted Labour in a general election and who
thought that the standard of the National Health Service (NHS) had fallen since
1997 were only half as likely to vote for Frank Dobson, Labour’s mayoral
candidate, as those who thought the standard of the health service had improved
(8 per cent as compared with 16 per cent). A similar picture also emerges in
relation to evaluations of the general standard of living. However, those who
perceived a decline in performance on health care or the standard of living were
no more likely to vote for Ken Livingstone than were those who thought
performance had improved. Thus, it does not appear that the key to Livingstone’s
success in the 2000 election was disaffection with the government’s performance
among Labour supporters. Rather, Labour supporters who were unhappy with
their party’s record in office (who, in the case of the NHS, only constituted one
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So if people did not turn against Labour in the 2000 London election in order to
signal dissatisfaction with the national government, did they decide how to vote
on the basis of the issues facing the capital? The most high-profile issue in the
election campaign was the funding of the London Underground (Rallings and
Thrasher, 2000).While Frank Dobson backed the government’s proposals for a
private–public partnership, Ken Livingstone favoured retaining public control of
the Underground. There is some evidence that these differences of approach
were reflected in the voting behaviour of those who said they would have voted
Labour in a general election. Thus, among those Labour general election sup-
porters who believed that the London Underground should remain wholly
within the public sector, 38 per cent voted for Livingstone. In contrast, among
those who believed that the private sector should play some role, only 26 per cent
turned out for Livingstone. The equivalent figures for Dobson are 10 per cent
and 13 per cent. Even here, however, we should note that, among Labour
supporters who favoured the private–public option, twice as many backed
Livingstone as Dobson. Thus Livingstone’s victory in the mayoral election does
not appear to be a reflection of popular support for his position on what at the
time was the key issue facing the capital.27
There is also little evidence that the issue which subsequently became the most
distinctive policy pursued by Livingstone as mayor, the introduction of a con-
gestion charge (a policy opposed by Dobson), had much influence on the way
Labour general election supporters voted in 2000. Those in favour of the
congestion charge were only slightly more likely to vote for Livingstone (31 per
cent) than were opponents of the charge (28 per cent). Moreover, opponents of
congestion charging were actually less likely to turn out for Dobson (11 per cent)
than those who strongly favoured this policy (20 per cent).28
Yet if Livingstone’s electoral success cannot be attributed to his stance on the key
policy issues facing London, this does not mean that local concerns were wholly
absent. The 2000 survey shows that Livingstone was trusted more than Dobson to
represent London’s interests, and that this perception significantly shaped Living-
stone’s electoral success.Among Labour general election supporters, two in three
trusted Livingstone to work in London’s interests, while only one-half said the
same about Dobson (among Londoners as a whole, Livingstone’s lead in this
respect was even greater: 56 per cent to 33 per cent). Moreover, 54 per cent of
Labour supporters who said they ‘just about always’ trusted Livingstone to work in
London’s interests turned out to vote for him, compared with just 10 per cent of
those who trusted him‘only some or the time’or‘almost never’.Among those who
trusted Dobson to work in London’s interests, 27 per cent turned out to vote for
him, compared with just 3 per cent of those who did not trust him. Thus, what
appears to have mattered to voters were not the particular policies promoted by
the candidates, but a more synoptic view of which candidate would best stand up
for the capital’s interests. In this, there are echoes of what happened in the devolved
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In order to identify what effects these various factors had when considered
simultaneously, we constructed a multivariate regression model of voting at the
2000 London election. Specifically, we examined which factors explained
voting for either Frank Dobson or Ken Livingstone among people who indi-
cated they would have voted Labour if a general election had been held simul-
taneously.We modelled voting behaviour as a three-way choice: voting either
for Dobson or for Livingstone or for neither (that is for another candidate or
not voting in the mayoral contest at all). Given this three-way electoral choice,
we estimate parameters using a multinomial logistic regression. Table 7 reports
the parameters for those who voted for either Dobson or Livingstone, with
those voting for neither candidate as the reference category. Our independent
variables tap potential discontent with the national government (as measured by
retrospective evaluations of the health service and standard of living), attitudes
towards local issues (namely the funding of the Underground, congestion
charging and the extent to which the capital gains its ‘fair share’ of government
spending) and evaluations of how far each candidate could be trusted to rep-
resent London’s interests. Full details of these variables and their coding are
given in Appendix 1.
The results confirm our earlier analysis that Livingstone’s electoral success did not
derive from discontent with the Labour government. Voting for Livingstone was
not significantly affected by judgements about policy performance on such
national issues as the NHS and living standards. But nor did Livingstone benefit
from the electorate’s views on local issues. Only on the issue of public transport
did he derive support on a distinctively London issue. Instead, Livingstone drew
electoral support most strongly – as did Dobson – from those who trusted him
to represent London’s interests.
So while the first London election was clearly not a ‘second-order’ contest
(decided primarily by views about the performance of the government at West-
minster), neither was it wholly a ‘first-order’ contest (decided primarily by specific
local issues).29 Instead, the result of the mayoral election reflected voters’ assess-
ment of who would best represent the capital’s interests more generally. Mayoral
elections may be an effective means of securing a champion for a local area, but
they are not necessarily an effective means of ensuring that voters focus on the
key issues facing their locality.
Conclusion
The establishment of a directly elected mayor in London is the most prominent
example of the government’s reform of executive arrangements at the local level.
Even though London’s citizens expressed some doubts over how much impact
their new institutions would have, the move was clearly a popular one, contrasting
with the position in two-thirds of the places elsewhere in England to have
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Table 7: Models of Vote Choice at the London Mayoral Election, 2000 among
Labour Supporters
Voted Dobson Voted Livingstone
B se B se
Retrospective evaluations
Standard of the NHS since 1997
Fallen -0.86 0.51 -0.34 0.36
Stayed same -0.50 0.39 -0.25 0.29
(Increased)
Standard of living since 1997
Fallen -0.15 0.58 0.15 0.38
Stayed same -0.57 0.37 0.15 0.25
(Increased)
London issues
How much agree that motorists should
pay for driving into London
0.08 0.11 0.06 0.07
Public sector is best for London
Underground (private or
public/private sector is best)
0.06 0.34 0.67 0.23**
London gets less than its fair share of
government spending (London gets
fair share or more than fair share)
-0.12 0.35 0.03 0.25
London leadership
Trust Dobson to work in London’s
interests
Always 2.41 0.54** -0.43 0.40
Most of the time 1.80 0.46** -0.29 0.24
(only some of the time/never)
Trust Livingstone to work in London’s
interests
Always -1.28 0.50* 2.28 0.37**
Most of the time -0.50 0.38 1.46 0.35**
(only some of the time/never)
Constant -1.92 0.63** -2.08 0.47**
Model x2 (df ) 116.26 (22)**
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.27
N 436
Notes: Multinomial logistic regression model, showing parameter estimates and associated standard errors.
Categorical independent variables show reference category in parentheses. Table is confined to those who said
they would have voted Labour in a Westminster general election.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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generated because the London mayor became linked to people’s feelings of
territorial identity, thereby providing an important ‘reservoir’ of diffuse support
for the institution.30 However, repeating that link in other towns and cities may
be more difficult. Here, elected mayors will sit alongside an existing council with
strong prior claims to represent an area. In London, by contrast, the elected mayor
was part of a new set of institutions with unique claims to represent and symbolise
the whole of the city. If so, this rationale might help explain why much of the rest
of the country has been reluctant to follow London’s example in introducing
directly elected mayors.
Our analysis of London’s experience of mayoral elections to date provides only
limited evidence that they work in the manner claimed by their advocates. These
elections failed to generate sufficient enthusiasm to yield a turnout higher than in
other local elections.31We have shown that there were widespread doubts among
London’s citizens in 2000 about whether the new institutions would make much
difference to policy and governance outcomes. An element of excitement was
therefore required for Londoners to be persuaded to participate in the mayoral
contest. In the event, however, such excitement appears to have been lacking,
with many people perceiving little difference between the candidates. Evidently,
mayoral elections in themselves do not guarantee voters the kind of incentives
and choices that encourage participation.
The evidence from London also casts doubt on the role of mayoral elections as
a means of addressing local policy issues. Granted, the experience of London
suggests that mayoral elections can help focus the public’s attention on who is
best suited to provide local leadership. In doing so,mayoral elections also seem to
encourage a focus on the qualities of the candidates on offer, and not simply on
their party labels. Equally, mayoral elections are not clearly ‘second-order’ con-
tests, in which the outcome is determined by the popularity of the incumbent
national government. Yet, with the partial exception of attitudes towards the
London Underground, we have uncovered little evidence that the first London
election was decided on the key local issues facing the capital. In this, mayoral
elections may be little different from other local elections.Certainly, our evidence
suggests that mayoral elections – supposedly high-profile and candidate-oriented
contests – are not necessarily more effective than other forms of election in
ensuring that local votes are based on local issues.
Of course, the Labour government’s recent proposal to extend directly elected
mayors more widely across England reflects more than just the perceived effec-
tiveness of mayoral elections. In other respects, directly elected mayors may be
regarded as a success and provide sufficient justification for their adoption. But
our analysis of the experience of mayoral elections in London – so far at least –
lends little weight to the case for change. The claim that mayoral elections can
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Appendix 1: Details of Variables and Coding for Table 7
Retrospective Evaluations
Thinking back to the last general election in 1997, would you say that since then
the standard of the health service/general standard of living has:
Fallen a little/Fallen a lot (coded 1)
Stayed the same (coded 2)
Increased a lot/Increased a little (coded 3)
London Issues
Do you agree or disagree that motorists who want to drive into central London
should have to buy a permit?
Five point scale, from strongly disagree (coded 1) to strongly agree (coded 5)
Which of these options would be best for the future of the London Underground?
It should be run by the public sector alone (coded 1)
It should be run by the private sector alone/By the public and private sector in
partnership (coded 2)
Would you say that compared with the rest of Britain London gets more than its
fair share of government spending, less than its fair share or is London’s share of
government spending about right?
Less than its fair share (coded 1)
More than its fair share/About right (coded 2)
London Leadership
How much would you trust Frank Dobson/Ken Livingstone to work in
London’s interests?
Trust always (coded 1)
Trust most of the time (coded 2)
Trust only some of the time/almost never (coded 3)
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Notes
1 The London Mayoral Election Survey 2000 was funded by the Leverhulme Trust, under its ‘Nations and Regions’
programme, based at Edinburgh University and University College London. Data are deposited at the UK Data
Archive at Essex, study number 4,443. For technical details of the survey, see Thomson et al. (2001).
2 The response rate is calculated as the proportion of eligible telephone numbers (i.e. those relating to private
individuals, not businesses) generating a response to the survey. The response rate can only be estimated since it is
not always possible to ascertain whether a phone number is a private telephone number or not. The sampling for
the survey is discussed in more detail in Thomson et al. (2001).
3 Details of the weighting scheme can be found in Thomson et al. (2001).
4 The Greater LondonAssembly Election Study 2004 was funded by the ESRC,under its ‘Devolution and Constitutional
Change’ programme. Data are deposited at the UK Data Archive at Essex, study number 5,277.
5 Details of the 2004 survey are available in Margetts (2006). As quota samples do not have a sampling frame it is
impossible to cite a response rate for this survey.
6 The low turnout may have reflected a perception that the result was a foregone conclusion. Yet a positive response
to the government’s devolution proposal was also forecast in the Scottish referendum held a year earlier, yet this still
attracted a far higher turnout of 60 per cent.
7 The London Mayoral Election Study fielded questions on attitudes to the GLA to a half sample only. Therefore, the
base for all these attitudinal measures is 781.
8 The difference in proportions favouring the mayor and assembly is statistically significant.
9 Those who said ‘Don’t Know’ or did not answer the question are excluded from the analysis.Given the distribution
of the dependent variable (Table 1),we also conducted two binary logistic regression models (using as the categories
of interest either favouring the mayor or assembly ‘very much’ and ‘a bit’, or just ‘very much’). The substantive results
were similar to the ordinal logistic model.
10 Some analyses of support for devolution in Scotland have found that national identity becomes a weak predictor
of attitudes once people’s expectations of the likely performance of the Scottish Parliament are taken into account
(Brown et al., 1999, pp. 124–8; Paterson et al., 2001, pp. 112–5). Unfortunately, we cannot test this possibility in
London because of the split nature of our sample. Those questions that measured attitudes to the mayor and
assembly, and those that tapped expectations of mayoral and assembly performance were administered to different
halves of the sample.
11 Polls conducted prior to the 2000 election found that a large number of people did not know that an assembly was
to be elected alongside the mayor (Electoral Commission, 2003, p. 57).
12 The marginal utility of participating would also be lessened if people felt that the outcome of the election was a
foregone conclusion. Indeed in 2000, opinion polls put the lead of the front-runner, Ken Livingstone, at up to 50
points over the second-placed candidate just a month before polling day. However, this lead had fallen to 15 points
by the time that polling day came around (Rallings andThrasher, 2000, p. 755).Moreover, we should bear in mind
that the race for the simultaneous assembly election was predicted to be much closer. In any event the survey on
which we draw did not contain any measures that tapped people’s perceptions of how close the election would be,
perceptions that would, in any case, be contaminated in a post-election survey by knowledge of the actual result.
We thus cannot formally test this rationale for the low turnout.
13 Unfortunately the same question was not included in the 2001 British Election Study.
14 Given the low expectations of what the institutions could achieve, and the limited electoral choices thought to be
on offer, it is maybe not surprising that, when asked how much they cared who won the mayoral contest, almost
as many (47 per cent) said they did not care very much as said they cared a good deal (51 per cent). This 51 per
cent figure compares unfavourably with the 64 per cent of people in Scotland who said they cared a good deal about
the outcome of the 1999 Scottish Parliament election, although it is slightly higher than the proportion of Welsh
respondents – 49 per cent – who said they cared about the outcome of the first Welsh Assembly election. This
variable is not included in our models of voting turnout below, because it does not take us very far in explaining
why people did not participate.
15 This step reduces our base N to 970 respondents.While some respondents are likely to have mis-recalled whether
or not they voted in 1997, our – not unreasonable – assumption is that there is no association between mis-recall
and the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the model such that our results might be
seriously biased. In any event, it should be noted that the proportion in our sample who claimed to have voted in
1997, 71 per cent, is only slightly higher than the official turnout in London in 1997, at 68 per cent.
16 It is possible that people who are politically aware and engaged are more likely both to have perceived differences
between the parties and the candidates, and to have participated in the London election.As a result the relationship
between perceived party/candidate differences and turnout could be an artefact. The London Mayoral Election
Survey did not include any measures of political engagement or interest, so we cannot test this possibility directly.
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interested have already been disproportionately excluded from our analysis. In addition, the survey did carry one
measure of political knowledge, in the form of a four-item ‘quiz’ that tested knowledge of the GLA, a measure that
we can anticipate being related to political interest. The relationship between this knowledge score and perceived
party/candidate difference proves to be a minor one. For example, among those who said they voted in 1997, there
was only a weak relationship between the perceived difference between Steve Norris and Ken Livingstone and the
score on our GLA knowledge quiz (Cramer’s V = 0.09, significant only at the 10 per cent level).
17 Defined as being strongly in favour of one candidate/party while being strongly against another.
18 Of those who felt the same about Dobson and Livingstone, just 49 per cent made it to the polls compared with 72
per cent among those who felt very differently about them.Equally, just 49 per cent who felt the same about Labour
and the Conservatives participated, against 66 per cent who felt very differently about the two parties.
19 However, evaluations of the difference between Livingstone and Norris were marginally more important for
turnout than expectations about public transport. TheWald score for perceived difference between Livingstone and
Norris (10.591) is slightly greater than that for expectations about public transport (9.744). Readers will note that
the R2 of model III is, at 18 per cent, surprisingly lower than that of model II (26 per cent). This arises because the
R2 for model I for the half sample on which model III is based is far lower (7 per cent) than it is for the half sample
on which model II is based (23 per cent). Thus, the addition to R2 provided by model III is, at 11 per cent, in fact
much greater than that delivered by model II (3 per cent).
20 Indeed, we should note that, outside London, Independents have secured election as directly elected mayors on no
less than five occasions. Only twice did this occur on a council with a substantial representation of Independent
councillors.
21 Thus, in the analysis that follows, and in Tables 5 and 6, those among our sample who voted for Livingstone in 2000
are wholly excluded from the calculations.
22 True, if a voter is confident that their preferred candidate will be one of the top two candidates, they could decide
to cast their first vote for another candidate who they think might fill the other top two position but who is unlikely
to attract many second-preference votes. Such behaviour might increase the chances of their preferred candidate
being elected. But the sophistication required to engage in such behaviour is considerable, and we would suggest
that few Londoners behaved in this way.
23 Favouring a candidate or party is defined as giving them a rating of 5 (‘strongly favour’) or 4 (‘favour’) on the
5-point scale in 2000, and as giving them a rating of 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale (1 = dislike a lot, 7 = like a lot) in
2004.
24 We exclude from the analysis all those who voted for a party other than Labour, the Conservatives or the Liberal
Democrats, or for a mayoral candidate not standing for one of these parties.
25 There were two instances where evaluations of a party or candidate other than the one the respondent voted for
appear to have mattered. Both these cases support our general argument. They show that evaluations of a party are
significantly associated with voting in the assembly contest, while evaluations of the party’s mayoral candidate have
no such effect. Thus, in 2000, the odds of voting Conservative on the assembly list vote were significantly
(negatively) affected by evaluations of Labour, while at the same election the odds of voting Labour were
significantly (negatively) affected by evaluations of the Conservatives. In neither case did evaluations of the
opposition party’s mayoral candidate have any significant effect.
26 Abstention in the London election in 2000 among Labour supporters unhappy with the government’s performance
on the NHS was 55 per cent, as against 40 per cent among those happy with NHS performance. In the case of the
standard of living the equivalent figures were 54 per cent and 43 per cent.
27 Indeed, just 40 per cent of Londoners backed Livingstone’s policy of a publicly owned and operated Underground,
while slightly more – 45 per cent – backed the public–private partnership. Even among people who indicated they
would have voted Labour at a general election, as many backed the public–private partnership as did the public
sector solution.
28 Indeed, Livingstone’s position on congestion charging commanded the support of less than half of Londoners in
2000 (43 per cent).
29 Although we have less data by which to gauge the ‘first-order’/‘second-order’ status of the second London election
in 2004, there are some indications that this contest, too, hardly revolved on national-level issues. Thus, asked which
factors were important to them in voting in 2004, twice as many respondents answered ‘choosing the best people
to run London’ (51 per cent) as answered ‘letting the national government know what you think about national
issues’ (24 per cent).
30 For the importance of such ‘diffuse’ support in the context of devolution to Scotland, see Curtice (2005).
31 The same is also true of mayoral elections elsewhere (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006).
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